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By: Dilip Mukerjee 
MR. Dilip Mukerjee is editorial adviser to Business Times in Kuala Lumpur and South East Asia 
correspondent of Times of India. Recently he studied the role of foreign investments in general in the 
economic development of ASEAN countries and of European industrial investments in particular. 
Mr. Mukerjee found that the European share as a whole is relatively declining. The European 
Commission is aware of this trend and has taken the initiatzve to improve European efforts in th£s region. 
Meetings between A SEAN and European business leaders have been organised in Brussels in 1977 and in 
Jakarta in 1979. In May of this year the ASEAN-EEC Business Council will start its operations. Of course 
one cannot expect z"mmedzate results but anyway these various initzatzves will contribute to a better knowledge 
of the investment possibilities in the ASEAN countries and eventually to an increasing European industrial 
involvement in the economic development of these countries. 
Following are Mr. DiUp Mukerjee's articles. The reader wz"ll understand that artzdes for a magazine 
cannot be exhaustz"ve. He has Umited himself to a general impression based on the latest figures made 
available by the authorities. 
SINGAPORE: 
EEC-firms better attuned 
to long-term goals 
Singapore is an almost in-
credible success story. Dependent 
on imports even for its water 
supply, the city state has managed 
nevertheless to raise its national 
income six-fold in the past two 
decades to bring its "indigenous" 
per capita income to above 
US$3,500. These achievements are 
well known, but few perhaps rea-
lise how much of this derives 
from foreign investment in the 
economy. 
Consider the manufacturing 
sector. In 1979, the last year for 
which figures are available, foreign 
controlled companies accounted for 
77 per cent of the total value 
added, 58 per cent of employment, 
85 per cent of exports and 73 per 
cent of all capital expenditures. 
True, manufacturing is only 
one part of the Singapore economy 
- accounting for about 25 per 
cent of the total. But if figures 
were available for the other dyna-
mic sector, business and financial 
services, they would tell much the 
same story, largely because Singa-
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pore has as a matter of deliberate 
policy kept its doors wide open. 
Over lOO commercial banks from 
all over the world are represented 
in Singapore. 
The EEC, considered collec-
tively, is the largest single source of 
foreign investment in Singapore, 
the only Asean country where it is 
at the top of the league. But it is 
better not to make too much of 
this because the EEC's relative 
share has been on the decline. The 
three largest investors - Britain, 
The Netherlands and West-Germa-
ny - accounted for 39 per cent of 
the global total in 1979, down 
from 42 per cent in 1970. Looking 
further back, the share was 52 per 
cent in 1965 though West-Germany 
had yet to enter the scene. 
Headstart 
What this brings out is that 
the EEC had a head start because 
of the direct historical linkage with 
Britain and less directly with The 
Netherlands via neighbouring In-
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donesia for which Singapore served 
as an entrepot. When Singapore 
started building up its industrial 
base in the mid-1960's the EEC 
share in the flow of direct invest-
ments from industrial countries to 
Third World nations had already 
started to decline, the gainers be-
ing the US and Japan. 
The result in Singapore's case 
is that while US investment has 
increased 73-fold, and Japan's 38-
fold between 1965 and 1979, the 
EEC total is only 23 times higher. 
Reckoned on a national basis, the 
US is now by far the largest inves-
tor with a 29 per cent share, Japan 
second with the 16.5 per cent, 
followed by Britain 16.2 per cent 
and The Netherlands 15.9 per 
cent. Against this, the last two 
were far and away the biggest in 
1965. 
If allowance is however made 
for British and Dutch investments 
via overseas subsidiaries and tax 
havens, the picture would change. 
For example, official data show no 
EEC investment in tobacco pro-
ducts although companies of Bri-
tish parentage are undoubtedly the 
largest on the scene. But the point 
remains valid that the higher 
6Towth rate of American and Japa-
nese investments make them in-
creasingly important to the repub-
lic. Their lead will lengthen be-
cause of their investment in a US$2 
billion petrochemicals complex -
by far the biggest ever investment 
ASEAN - FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY MAJOR INVESTOR COUNTRY 
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March 1980; (2) Investments in Approved companies in production as at end of year, from Federal Industrial Development 
Authority, Annual Report 1978; (3) Investment approvals by the Board of Investment; (4) Gross fixed assets from Economic 
Development Board data; (5) Registered capital data from Board of Investment. 
in which the EEC has a minor 
stake in one of the six plants con-
stituting the complex. 
Singapore will no doubt con-
tinue to woo the EEC's investors 
because it is even now - in global 
terms - twice as large a source of 
investment for third world coun-
tries than Japan. That apart, the 
EEC firms in Singapore are better 
attuned to its long term goals than 
their rivals. 
Since 1979, Singapore is em-
barked on what it calls its second 
industrial revolution. This involves 
moving out of labour-intensive and 
low value-added industries in which 
comparative advantage is shifting 
in favour of nations on lower rungs 
of the growth ladder. Besides, the 
republic is faced with an increasing 
labour-shortage because of its re-
markable success in bringing popu-
lation growth down to 1.4 per cent 
a year. The alternative to upgrad-
ing such industries as garments and 
wood products would be to admit 
even more guest workers who al-
ready accOunt for 15 per cent of 
the labour force. 
Profile 
Hence, Singapore's preference 
for industries like precision engi-
neering, speciality chemicals, elec-
tronic instrumentation, aircraft 
components and oil-field equip-
ment. Typically, these will require 
high investments per worker to 
achieve a high productivity. EEC 
firms are fairly well represented in 
these branches, but that apart EEC 
investment in the aggregate has the 
kind of profile that upgrading aims 
at. 
The value added per worker 
in EEC firms was $58,134 in 1979, 
or almost double the average for 
all foreign enterprises and three 
and a half times the figure for 
Japanese firms. This was largely 
due to the fact that almost three 
fourths of all EEC investment was 
in highly capital-intensive petro-
leum refining. But as Chia Siow 
Yue of the National University 
points out in a recent paper, the 
EEC average would be higher than 
others even if the petroleum indus-
try was left out of account. One 
reason of course is the total ab-
sence of EEC firms from fields like 
garments which might have pulled 
the average down. 
With petroleum refining 
throughout exceeding a million 
barrels a day - making it the 
world's second largest refinery cen-
tre - the industry looms large on 
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the industrial scene, accounting for 
over a third of total output and 18 
per cent of value added. With a 
dominant share in refining, the 
EEC thus gets a high rating in 
terms of all the major indicators. 
In 1979, the EEC share in 
Singapore's total manufactured ex-
ports was 36 per cent compared 
with 30 per cent for the US and 10 
per cent for Japan. The share in 
capital expenditures undertaken by 
all industries was also the highest, 
the EEC figure of 20 per cent 
exceeding the US figure of 16 per 
cent and Japan's 15 per cent. 
Skill development 
Another factor which corn-
mends EEC firms to Singapore is 
their role in skill development and 
transfer to technology. In 1972 
when Singapore began its climb up 
the technology ladder, it invited 
three firms to lend a hand by 
setting up an apprentice training 
programme. The four-year courses 
trained blue collar workers for such 
fields as optics, precision machinery 
and instrumentation. Since 1972 
till April 1981 , they had trained 
1, 728 and another 1, 240 were un-
der training. Two of the three were 
EEC firms Philips from the 
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Netherlands and Rollei from West 
Germany, the third being Tata 
from India. 
The collapse of Rollei last 
year in face of Japan's growing 
technological edge in optics is a big 
setback not only for EEC and 
West-Germany but also for Singa-
pore. But the EEC role in training 
will not be diminished because two 
new higher level training institutes 
are to be set up - one this year in 
collaboration with West-Germany 
and another next year with help 
from France. The first will special-
ise in production engineering and 
the second in control engineering 
through microprocessors and robo-
tics. 
INDONESIA 
Apart from the part played 
by EEC and its firms in institution-
al training, the latter get high 
marks also for their attention to 
on-the-job training. An index con-
structed by Ting Wen-Lee to com-
pare the performance of 22 US, 
Japanese and European firms ope-
rating in Singapore shows the Eu-
ropeans as having achieved the 
highest skill transfer. 
They took second place after 
Japan, however, in proportion of 
employees under training, the res-
pective figures being 15 and 13 per 
cent. This shows that even in this 
area of skill development Japan is 
catching up - making it necessary 
for EEC firms to try harder if they 
are to maintain their lead.D 
EEC well represented 
agricultural sector 
• tn 
Among the five Asean coun-
tries, Indonesia has the highest 
stock of Foreign investment. It 
amounted to something like 
US$10 billion at the end of 1980. 
In a sense, this is not surprising: 
the country accounts for almost 
three-fifths of Asean's total popu-
lation and has a great wealth of 
natural resources. 
Investment elsewhere in Asean 
represents the accumulation over 
many years, including that put in 
Philips in Singapore. 
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before World War 11. Indonesia 
too started on its independent exis-
tence in 1950 with about a billion 
US dollars of Dutch investment in 
plantations, mining, banking and 
manufacturing. But all of this was 
nationalized in the conflict between 
the two countries over the future of 
West Irian in the late 1950's. 
Some of these were returned 
when the present regime took over 
in 1966, and resumed activities as 
joint ventures. The bulk, however, 
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remained in Indonesian hands fol-
lowing compensation on mutually 
agreed terms. This means the pre-
sent stock of foreign capital consists 
mainly of what investors have put 
in since the country adopted a 
comprehensive investment law in 
1967. 
Diversification 
All Third World countries 
prefer to obtain investments from 
as many different sources as possi-
ble to avoid over-dependence on 
any one. The political compulsion 
to achieve such diversification is 
greater in Indonesia than elsewhere 
in Asean because of the memory of 
the riots which greeted Japanese 
prime minister Kakuei Tanaka 
when he visited Jakarta in 1974. 
The reasons for the outburst were 
complex but the broad message 
was unmistakably that the rapid 
build up of Japan's stake in manu-
facturing, forestry and construction 
had created sharp resentments. 
At the Asean-EEC business 
conference in Jakarta in January 
1979, many among Asean spokes-
men made the point that EEC was 
lagging behind the other two inves-
tors, the US and Japan, in this 
part of the world. Indonesian in-
dustry minister Mr. A.R. Suhud 
said the same thing with an added 
poignancy: he lamented that the 
EEC lag was "distorting" the for-
eign investment and trade patterns 
in the region. 
He was referring to the fact 
that the largest EEC investor, The 
Netherlands, accounted for less 
than four per cent of the total 
US$9 billion pledged between 1967 
and 1979. West-Germany account-
ed for 2.3 per cent and Britain for 
less than one per cent. 
The Jakarta conference was 
held soon after a sharp devaluation 
of the Indonesian rupiah, under-
taken with the express purpose of 
giving a boost to the languishing 
non-oil sector of the economy. The 
hope was to reverse the dependence 
on depleting oil resources that had 
increased very sharply since the 
mid-1960's. This is reflected in the 
fact that oil and gas have come to 
account for 70 per cent of all 
export earnings, and almost the 
same proportion of government re-
venues. 
The devaluation decision was 
clinched by signals from the World 
Bank which feared that oil output 
would soon peak, and rising do-
Unilever [Briti5h-Dutch] research developed a tissue culture method to achieve higher yields of oilpalms in 
Malaysia ..... 
mestic demand would sharply re-
duce the exportable surplus. This 
fear has receded since, partly be-
cause the second oil shock of 1979-
80 more than doubled the proceeds 
from oil and gas exports and partly 
because the high success rate being 
maintained in exploration with half 
the drilled wells striking oil or gas. 
Benefit 
The devaluation brought ob-
vious benefit; non -oil exports in-
creased in the fiscal year ending 
March 1980 by 50 per cent over 
the previous year. But they have 
fallen back since because of a wea-
kening of commodity prices, aggra-
vating the squeeze Indonesia is fac-
ing on account of the world oil 
glut which has obliged all produc-
ers to trim prices. 
As a result, Indonesia is more 
anxious than ever before to push 
the non-oil sectors of the economy 
forward. Mission after mission has 
been sent to Europe and the US 
looking for investments Indonesia 
needs to expand and rehabilitate 
plantations, exploit non-oil miner-
als, and diversify its industries to 
process available agricultural ma-
terials and minerals to give itself 
some safety from sharp falls in 
raw material prices. 
The missions have not so far 
been too successful. According to 
Bank of Indonesia data - quoted 
by Financial Tz"mes, London, in a 
recent survey - actual investment 
(measured in constant prices) in 
1979 and 1980 was half the average 
for 1971-75 and 20 per cent below 
the 1976-80 level. A pick-up, how-
ever, in recent investment pledges 
suggests that the outcome may be 
better in the next few years. 
Indonesia has in the past 
made strong bids to attract EEC 
firms into investing in non -oil mi-
nerals. Shell was invited to develop 
coal deposits in South Sumatra 
where resources are thought to ex-
ceed 10 billion tonnes. The idea 
was dropped in 1977 following the 
company's assessment that poor 
quality and high development costs 
made this coal unmarketable until 
the world energy supply was much 
tighter than at that time. Likewise, 
a bid to interest a Dutch-US con-
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sortium in developing nickel depo-
sits failed because of world market 
conditions. 
Less than 6 per cent of the 
EEC investment commitments of 
US$622 million, the figure as of 
March 1980, is for mining. Most of 
it is from The Netherlands in two 
projects which involved an initial 
investment of US$7 million. This 
average of US$3.5 million is small 
compared with US$110 million for 
Japan's three ventures, US$50 mil-
lion for three undertaken by US 
firms, and US$39 million for Ca-
nada's two. This clearly brings out 
that EEC investors have had until 
now rather limited objectives. 
Investments made in manu-
facturing which is the main focus 
of EEC investments, accounted for 
59 per cent of the total from The 
Netherlands, 88 per cent from 
West-Germany and 55 per cent 
from Britain. The same concentra-
tion is evident in the case of Ja-
panese investments, while the US 
and Canada have put their stakes 
mainly in mining. 
The average investment made 
by West-Germany for manufactur-







ing projects was US$5.6 million, 
The Netherlands 3.5 million and 
Britain 2.06 million, looks modest 
compared to Japan's 10.3 million 
although it was involved in as m a-
ny as 136 ventures against The 
Netherlands 34. This suggests that 
the Japanese are not only the larg-
est investors but also the most de-
termined to build an entrenched 
position. 
Japanese investments have a 
high capital intensity with invest-
ment per worker as high as 
US$62,200 compared with an aver-
age of US$21 ,500 for foreign invest-
ment in the aggregate. This is a 
cause for complaint by some Indo-
nesian economists. A paper pre-
pared by the University of Indone-
sia's faculty of economics says that 
wide gaps between Japanese and 
MALAYSIA 
other investors suggest "Japan's 
strong tendency to enter only its 
big firms into the Indonesian eco-
nomy, and to insist on the setting 
up of large-scale tightly controlled 
projects". 
Agriculture 
One area where EEC firms 
have made a better showing then 
the Japanese is agriculture 
largely because of traditional Bri-
tish links with plantation develop-
ment in Sumatra. As of March 
1980, Britain had a stake in 20 
agricultural projects with a total 
pledged investment of US$28 mil-
lion, or 26 per cent of its total 
stake in Indonesia. The Dutch, who 
pioneered plantations, had a hand 
in just four projects with a miniscule 
investment of just US$2 million in 
them or less than one per cent of 
the Dutch total. West-Germany was 
involved in only one but with a 
respectable initial investment of 
US$9 million or five per cent of its 
total stake. 
Predictably, The Netherlands 
investment is the most diversified; 
it is to be found in agriculture, 
forestry, mmmg manufacturing, 
construction, hotels, transport and 
services - covering in other words 
the entire spectrum with the excep-
tion of fishery. But the proposed 
initial investment was in the aggre-
gate about the same as that of 
overseas Chinese investors operating 
from Hongkong and Singapore. 
Taking these two together, they 
had almost 60 per cent more in-
vestment then the whole of the 
EEC.O 
Declining share of EEC investments 
With a population of just 
over 14 million people and a 
wealth of resources, Malaysia has 
little difficulty in accumulating 
the savings it needs to propel its 
economy forward. The effort put 
into developing these resources in 
the 1970's has given it both the 
will and the capacity to raise its 
industrial sights - as shown by 
the building of a liquefied na-
tural gas plant. 
Located in Bintulu, Sarawak, 
the plant is by far the biggest 
industrial project undertaken by the 
country involving a direct capital 
outlay of M$2,600 million (US$1 ,040 
million). There is in addition an 
indirect outlay of M$1 ,600 million 
on five LNG tankers being ac-
quired from France to ferry LNG 
to Japan for use by its utilities. 
The EEC has a stake in this 
prestige venture, a three-way part-
nership between Petronas, the na-
tional oil company, holding 65 per 
cent of the equity and the balance 
divided equally between Shell Gas 
BV of the Royal Dutch Shell group 
and Mitsubishi of Japan. Shell, 
however, has the responsibility for 
supervising the plant's construction 
and its subsequent performance, 
while another affiliate of the com-
pany is in charge of raising, col-
lecting and delivering gas to the plant 
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from its contract area. 
For the EEC with a declining 
share in Malaysia's trade and m-
vestments, the association with se-
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veral aspects of the project puts a 
feather in its cap. But it has missed 
out on the other major opportuni-
ties - m telecommunications, the 
steel-making facility in Trengganu, 
the sponge iron plant in Sabah, 
and the bridge that is to join 
Penang with the mainland. In these 
cases, the EEC bidders were up-
staged by those from Japan in the 
case of the first two, and from 
Austria and South Korea in the 
other two. 
Position of the U.K. 
In 1980, the last year for 
which figures are available, Britain 
was the only EEC country to find a 
place among the top five investors. 
It ranked fourth after Singapore, 
Japan and the US. Since Britain 
accounts for almost four-fifths of 
all EEC investments in Malaysia, 
the decline in the British share in 
total investments from almost 45 
per cent in 1970 to less than 15 
per cent now is the main' reason 
for the EEC's diminished role. 
This is all the more so be-
cause the other large EEC investors 
abroad - West Germany, France 
and The Netherlands - play a 
very minor part in Malaysia. This 
discrepancy between their role in a 
world-wide context and in Malaysia 
perplexes its decision makers; they 
keep asking themselves what they 
should do to get a more adequate 
share. 
This question has gained add-
ed importance in the past few 
months because of the strains that 
have surfaced in the relations with 
Britain. 
The British foreign secretary 
who paid a fence-mending visit in 
February went back saying that the 
problems underlying Malaysia's irri-
tations had accumulated over the 
years, and may therefore take time 
to restore. Malaysian Prime Minis-
ter, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, took 
much the same view when asked 
about Lord Carrington's comment. 
The point that is being miss-
ed in alarmist reports in the for-
eign media, is that the quarrel is a 
limited one concerning a few pre-
independence investments in tradi-
tional industries like rubber and 
tin. Malaysia wants them to fall in 
line with its "30-40-30" guideline 
calling for a reduction in foreign 
assets in the corporate sector to 30 
per cent by 1990, with the balance 
being held 30 per cent by Bumi-
putras, the sons of the soil, and 40 
per cent by other Malaysians. In 
1980, the respective shares were 
47.5, 12.5 and 40 per cent. 
A gradual restructuring of 
ownership is taking place by acqui-
sition of shares through market me-
chanisms. The end result is to 
leave the foreign investor with a 
substantial minority stake but often 
with a large say in operational 
management - as in the case of 
the world's largest tin company. It 
is only in cases where negotiations 
have got nowhere that Malaysia has 
adopted the alternative of buying 
control in the companies, mainly 
via the London stock exchange. 
It was one such purchase 
through a lightning raid on the 
London market last September that 
sparked the present dispute with 
Britain. The takeover of the large 
conglomerate, Guthrie, was in itself 
a dramatic event but it was made 
more so by subsequent develop-
ments, among them the changes in 
the Exchange's rule to prevent such 
sudden acquisitions and the Malay-
sian government's decision to take 
reprisals against British business by 
directing official agencies not to 
buy British unless there were com-
pelling reasons to do so. 
It should be noted however 
that a US$45 million order for 
weapons went to Britain neverthe-
less in January this year, but some 
long-standing contracts - as for 
UK-made Dunlop tyres - have not 
been renewed. British businessmen 
are understandably worried about 
the outlook not only for trade but 
also investment, with the emerging 
situation being watched with al-
most equal interest by their coun-
terparts in Europe and the US. 
No nationalism 
But there is no cause for 
British or any other investors -
existing or potential - to think 
that Malaysia is about to adopt 
hardline nationalist policies which 
may prove detrimental to its rela-
tions with the West. Incidentally, 
Dr. Mahathir has said time and 
again that his directive regarding 
purchases from Britain does not 
apply to British joint ventures ope-
rating in Malaysia. 
The row triggered by the Gu-
thrie episode, or the subsequent 
Malaysian move to set up a "produ-
cers only" club for tin, are specific 
responses to specific issues. They do 
not represent any change from the 
policy of welcome for foreign en-
terprises or any weakening of the 
commitment to open up the Malay-
sian economy by reducing tariff 
and other barriers. For instance, 
the budget last October lowered or 
abolished import duties in a wide 
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range of items with the object of 
reducing the cost of investment and 
increasing competition in the do-
mestic market. 
As Dr. Mahathir has said un-
equivocally, "we will continue to 
stimulate both foreign and local 
investment. The target for equity 
ownership is not what we apply to 
industry or every enterprise. It (the 
30-40-30 ratio) is only the overall 
average. There may be some enter-
prises with 100 per cent foreign 
ownership, some with 100 per cent 
Bumiputra ownership. We can 
have any combination between the 
two extremes depending upon our 
progress towards the (target) ratio". 
Taken along with his pledge 
that "the government will continue 
to ensure through appropriate poli-
cies and programmes a reasonable 
return on private investment", these 
statements confirm that Malaysian 
policies continue to be as pragma-
tic as under his predecessors. As he 
has said time and again, he at-
taches importance to maintaining 
continuity in economic policies. 
The role Malaysia envisages 
for foreign investment in the eco-
nomy is made clear by its projec-
tions that assets held in the corpo-
rate sector by foreign residents will 
rise from M$12.5 billion in 1980 to 
M$15.9 billion in 1985 and M$22.3 
billion in 1990 even while their 
share in the total falls to 37 per 
cent and eventually 30 per cent. 
Inflow 
Bank Negara projections as-
sume that the gross inflow of for-
eign investment will rise in 1981-85 
to M$11. 7 billion, or two and a 
half times more than the M$4. 6 
billion received during 1976-80. 
Given these perspectives, 
there is no question of Malaysia 
becoming inward-looking under Dr. 
Mahathir. The investment promo-
tion activities of the government 
are in fact being stepped up, with 
a special effort being made to in-
terest businessmen in countries with 
considerable potential but little in-
volvement in Malaysia so far. If 
anything, the tension vis-a-vis Bri-
tain has heightened the interest in 
this diversification. 
Although the EEC (largely 
British) investment in Malaysia has 
a lop-sided pattern - accounting 
for 56 per cent of the total in 
beverages and tobaccos but only 4 
per cent in transport equipment 
and 1.1 per cent in basic metal 
industries - an endeavour conti-
Europa March-April '82 
nues to be made to get greater 
participation in the priority sectors. 
An equally strong endeavour 
is being made to persuade existing 
investors to expand and diversify, 
or bring their affiliates into the 
country as has been done in the 
case of the LNG plant. Malaysian 
policy-makers say that the world-
wide shortage of capital makes re-
investment of profits by those al-
ready in the country even more 
important than would otherwise be 
the case. It is also acknowledged 
that such ploughing back would be 
the best advertisement Malaysia 
could wish for. This policy state-
ment is an added reason for confi-
dence that the climate for invest-
ment will remain as favourable as 
in the past.O 
THE PHILIPPINES 
EEC investments increased 
in 1981 
Structural adjustment is the 
new vogue word in the Philip-
pines; it is a catch-all label for 
changes the regime seeks to make 
to the economy to regain the mo-
mentum lost as a result of the 
successive oil shocks. The princi-
pal plank of the programme now 
under way is an ambitious scheme 
covering 11 major industrial pro-
jects for which investments and 
credits are being avidly sought 
from all over the world. 
Firms from EEC are being 
wooed as vigorously as those from 
the US and Japan, the biggest 
investors in the country. Of the 
seven projects finalised so far, five 
involve foreign participation in 
ownership - Japan in two and the 
EEC, US and the tiny Pacific is-
land of Nauru in one each. But ~or 
the last minute change on the part 
of a West-German collaborator 
picked for a project to produce 
high capacity diesel engines, the 
EEC might have drawn level with 
Japan. It may still do so as nego-
tiations are currently taking place 
with a British firm to fill the slot 
vacated by the West-German. 
As of now, only one German 
company is in the field; it is ex-
pected to find 30 per cent of the 
$120 million needed for a plant to 
turn coconut oil into fatty alcohol 
which will serve as the starting 
material for downstream industries 
producing a variety of chemicals. It 
provides a new outlet for a com-
modity on which one-third of the 
4 7 million population depends for 
a livelihood, thus offering some 
insurance against violent changes in 
its price. 
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Plantation agriculture 
Another area in which an 
EEC firm was making a pioneering 
start is plantation agriculture. In 
January 1980, Guthrie Corporation 
of London entered into a joint 
venture with Philippines' National 
Development Company to set up 
an oil palm plantation spread over 
8,000 hectares (20,000 acres) at a 
cost of $60 million, the first such 
venture since the early 1960's. In 
accordance with national laws re-
lating to land ownership, Guthrie 
was taking a minority stake but full 
responsibility for management. 
However, Guthrie - with its prin-
cipal operations in Malaysia - has 
since become a Malaysian-owned 
company following a successful 
takeover bid. 
The Guthrie deal was fol-
lowed by another with Dunlop but 
the British company eventually de-
cided not to go ahead because of 
local political complexities in the 
southern province where it was to 
locate its plantation. 
Notwithstanding such abortive 
starts, there is no mistaking the 
renewed interest of EEC firms in a 
country where their stake has been 
on the decline. It was admittedly 
never very large; the US was, as it 
still is, the dominant actor, and 
Japan came up very fast in the 
1970's to take the second place. 
The shares of the two in 1978, the 
last year for which figures are 
available, were 35 and 24 per cent 
with the EEC collectively ranking 
next with about 11 per cent. 
A UN study notes that among 
the top 1, 000 corporations in the Phi-
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lippines, as many as 324 had a 
foreign share in their equity. 
Among these, there were 49 with 
EEC connections. By far the largest 
number, 37, were British; West-
Germany was represented by five, 
the Netherlands by three, Luxem-
bourg and France by two each. 
Only three EEC firms made it to 
the list of top 20 investors - two 
British and one Dutch. Apart from 
two Canadian and one Australian, 
all the other 14 were American. 
In 29 out of 49 EEC-linked 
firms, its investors had 100 per 
cent ownership and a majority in 
another 13. The minority stake was 
quite often held by another foreign 
investor of a different nationality. 
In other words, EEC firms were 
characterised by a much higher 
degree of foreign control than was 
generally the case. In all 324 for-
eign affiliated ventures taken to-
gether, 20 per cent were wholly 
owned by foreign investors and they 
had a majority stake in another 28 
per cent. 
Mining 
Foreign-affiliated firms were 
predominant in the mining indus-
try. Of 17 firms among the top 
1, 000 engaged in mining, 15 had 
foreign linkages. This was due to 
the fact that what first brought 
foreign investors into the Philippines 
was its mineral resources, which 
were identified and developed by 
them for the benefit of their parent 
companies, mainly in the US. 
Among the 461 top firms in the 
manufacturing sector, 212 or 46 
per cent had foreign links - with 
the US again leading the rest by a 
large margin. 
The US link continued for 
many years to be as strong as 
before independence in 1945, first 
because of the special relationship 
maintained between the two coun-
tries in terms of a 1946 agreement 
on trade which was superseded in 
1954 by the Laurel-Langley agree-
ment. Until its termination in 1974, 
US citizens - individuals and cor-
porations - were entitled to equa-
lity with Philippines nationals in 
many important respects in return 
for privileged access for Philippines 
products in the US market. 
Despite this unique position, 
US investments increased almost as 
much through reinvestment of 
earnings as through capital brought 
into the country. As the UN study 
shows, US investment increased 
about US$150 million in 
-49 to US$831 million in 1973-
0f this, 45 per cent came from 
vested earnings. 
In other words, much of the 
US share in new investments, re-
corded by the Board of Investments 
since its setting up in 1968, has 
come from income generated by 
companies entrenched in the coun-
try from before. Growth of some 
EEC investments took place in a 
similar fashion but to a lesser ex-
tent - as was only to be expected 
because of their relatively small 
size. 
In view of the slender link-
ages of the EEC business communi-
ty with the Philippines' with Bri-
tain being the sole exception 
among the ten member nations, it 
is something of a surprise that 
Britain and The Netherlands 
emerged as the third and fourth 
largest investors in 1981. The first 
place went as usual to the US and 
the second to Nauru, the phos-
phate island for its one-off invest-
ment in a fertilizer plant for which 
it will provide the basic raw mate-
rial. 
Revival 
The total amount pledged in 
1981, US$238 million, is an all-
time record as the 1980 figure of 
US$226 million was until then. 
This points to a revival of flows 
which peaked at around US$200 
million in 1974 but plunged down-
wards thereafter as the first oil 
shock and subsequent world-wide 
recession led to a pause everywhere. 
The Philippines certainly needs 
increased investments. With its exter-
nal debts now exceeding US$15 
billion and debt service edging up 
towards the self-imposed 20 per 
cent ceiling (reckoned in terms of 
the previous year's export earnings), 
the country is naturally anxious to 
promote inflows by way of equity 
in both export-oriented and import 
substituting industries. 
The free trade zone it set up 
in Bataan, close to Manila, has 
paid off. One indicator of success 
is that electronics assembly plants 
located in the zone and elsewhere 
are now earning upwards of 
US$600 million from exports or six 
times more than in 1975. All the 
major names in the US industry 
are participating in this high-
growth area but the Europeans have 
yet to make their presence felt. 
The other fields in which the 
Philippines hopes to build up signi-
ficant export capability are gar-
ments and textiles, leather and 
footwear, food processing, handi-
crafts and overseas contracting. 
From a level of around US$1 bil-
lion in 1978, such non-traditional 
exports are expected to grow at an 
average of 18 per cent in real 
terms to yield US$3 billion by 
1983. Most of these industries are 
unlikely to attract much European 
or American interest since the size 
of individual operations is likely to 
be too small to interest substantial 
investors. But there should undoubt-
edly be scope for subcontracting 
work to them provided local agen-
cies were available to act as in-
termediaries between bulk buyers 
and Philippines' producers. This 
role is expected to be filled by in-
ternational trading companies the 
country is setting up by pooling the 
resources of its 12 leading business 
groups. 
Warm welcome 
As industry m1mster Roberto 
V. Ongpin says, foreign investment 
has always been given a warm 
welcome. The government is now 
determined to make it even more 
attractive to take a stake in The Phi-
lippines' growth by giving new incen-
tives, including majority or even 
100 per cent ownership in pioneer-
ing projects (such as a diesel engine 
plant being set up by a Japanese com-
pany), guaranteed repatriation of 
profits, exemption from import du-
ties and other levies, and tax holi-
days. As a result of these changes, 
foreign companies are now free to 
open up new mines. 
These concessions underline 
the importance attached to draw-
ing in investment and to remove 
procedural and other obstacles 
which might delay getting it to 
work. The government stands com-
mitted in term of the loans it has 
obtained from both the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank to put through the 
economy's structural adjustment as 
fast as possible. It cannot afford to 
fail because that will put future 
credits from these saviours in j~o­
pardy.D 
THAILAND 
EEC firms mostly 
• • • tn JOint-ventures 
The burden of rising oil 
bills, pre-empting over 40 per 
cent of export earnings, is Thai-
land's most urgent economic pro-
blem. Since economic growth re-
quires in its circumstances large 
imports of capital goods and in-
dustrial materials - accounting 
for almost half of domestic capital 
formation - the country has re-
luctantly decided to lower its 
sights. 
Thailand's fifth plan, cover-
ing the 1982 to 1986 period, shows 
that it is resigned to a growth rate 
of around 6 per cent per year, 
compared with 8 per cent in the 
five years before the second oil 
shock hit the country in 1979. This 
means, on the face of it, fewer 
opportunities for foreign invest-
ment. Since the inflow in the 1976-
80 period was marginally lower 
than in the previous five years, a 
further decline seems even more 
plausible. 
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But Thai economists point 
out quite correctly that mounting 
trade deficits make it even more 
necessary to draw in foreign invest-
ments as well as the loans that 
investors often provide to supple-
ment their equity contribution. As 
the economists show, the contribu-
tion of foreign investment has al-
ready gone down precipitately from 
around 8 per cent of private do-
mestic investment in 1974, the year 
in which direct foreign investment 
peaked at US$189 million, to un-
der one per cent in 1980. 
Investment promotion 
The government responded to 
this trend by revising the invest-
ment promotion law in 1977 offer-
ing more generous tax benefits and 
other privileges, and enhancing the 
powers of the Board of Investments 
to decide on issues raised by inves-
tors. At the same time, an invest-
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ment service centre was established 
to cut through red tape. 
The changes have yielded 
some results as shown by the res-
ponse of Japanese firms, the lead-
ing investors. Their stake in Thai-
land increased by US$118 million 
in 1977-80 compared with US$83 
million in 1974-77. But taking in-
flation into account, the net out-
come was probably continued stag-
nation. 
Naturally, Thai policy-makers 
are now more interested than ever 
in drawing in investments from 
other sources which have so far 
taken a limited share. This is why 
their thoughts turn to the EEC 
which had at the end of 1980 a 
stake of less than 800 million baht 
(approximately US$39.0 million) in 
joint or wholly owned v,entures. 
This was about 12 per cent of the 
total from all sources, putting the 
EEC way behind Japan and almost 
on par with the US and, strangely 
enough, Taiwan. 
About half of the EEC invest-
ment comes from Britain with a 
long history of involvement in rub-
ber, tin and timber industries and 
some share also in finance and 
public utilities. This connection de-
rived from the fact that Thailand, 
though independent, stood sand-
wiched between two former British 
colonies, Burma and Malaysia, giv-
ing London a considerable interest 
in maintaining a presence in Bang-
kok and retaining the goodwill of 
its rulers. 
West-Germany and the Ne-
therlands are the next most impor-
tant investors. The great bulk of 
EEC investments is in the form of 
joint-ventures. Out of 99 EEC-asso-
ciated firms, 90 fell in the joint 
venture category accounting for 
nine-tenths of the total EEC invest-
ment in the country. 
An unusual feature of the 
links with the EEC is that its firms 
seem to have preferred taking a 
minority stake. In 58 out of 99 
firms, the foreign stake is below 30 
per cent. In another 28, it is below 
50 per cent - leaving only 13 
cases in which there is controlling 
stake or total ownership. Consider-
ing the 90 joint-ventures separately, 
the EEC stake in the total invest-
ment put into them was 22.4 per 
cent. Another 8.4 per cent was 
held by other foreign investors, 
with local capital supplying the 
balance of 69.2 per cent. The local 
stake joint-ventures with Japan is 
marginally smaller - about 60 per 
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Hoechst Chemical plant in Thaz"land. 
cent on average. 
This may however be a mis-
leading indicator of the foreign 
role. Studies show that since for-
eign investment was usually concen-
trated in just one or two hands 
while Thai shares were dispersed 
among many holders, the foreign 
partners had an edge in manage-
ment decisions. In any case, they 
supplied the technology and made 
the operating decisions. 
Looking at industry-wise dis-
tribution of EEC firms, what stands 
out is that minerals, metals and 
ceramics taken together account for 
about a fifth of their total invest-
ment, the highest concentration in 
any one industry group. Service 
industries, including banking, rank 
second (13 per cent) while agricul-
tural products and commodities 
take third place (11.3 per cent). 
Chemical and chemical products 
and engineering are ranked next (7 
per cent and 4.4 per cent). The 
pattern is distinctly different from 
Japan's: 45 per cent of its invest-
ments are in the textile industry 
and 14 per cent each in chemicals 
and engineering. 
Import substitution 
Foreign investment in Thai-
land is heavily oriented towards 
import substitution; this is why it 
came into the country in the first 
place. But as the local market 
became saturated, growth had to 
depend on developing exports as in 
the case of textiles. Currently, 
about a fifth of the output of 
cotton fabrics and two-fifths of syn-
thetic fabrics is exported, largely 
14 
by the Japanese firms. This is a 
plus factor in their favour in a 
country desperately anxious to in-
crease export earnings. The EEC 
firms on the other hand are in 
industrial fields in which the scope 
for exports seems more limited. 
This is a factor that holds their 
growth down in most cases to the 
small rate at which the domestic 
market is growing. 
Financing 
An interesting difference in 
the behavior of firms of different 
origins is their differing reliance 
upon equity and loans. Inflows 
from the US were mainly in the 
form of equity, about two-thirds of 
the total. The Japanese relied on 
this form of financing for about 
three-fifths of the total, but it was 
down to about half in the case of 
British firms. West-Germany was in 
the exceptional position of contri-
buting over four-fifths as equity. 
This may be due to differing 
national preferences about gearing. 
But it may also be an indication, 
at least in part, of the level of 
confidence in the country's long-
term prospects. This may be relat-
ed to the fact that one study, 
though of rather limited coverage, 
brought out that European inves-
tors put "political stability" as the 
factor of highest concern to them 
among 17 they were asked to 
choose from. 
With the two largest EEC 
investors, Britain and West-Germa-
ny, accounting for only 6 per cent 
of the gross investment inflow in 
Thailand in 1970-80, it is difficult 
to envisage EEC firms playing a 
substantial role in the coming years. 
This is all the more so because the 
largest investments will take place 
in gas or gas-based industries on 
the country's southern shores -
fields in which US and Japanese 
firms tend to take the lead. 
The US and Japan are alrea-
dy involved directly in the explora-
tion and development of gas, with 
Japanese firms taking 20 per cent 
of the equity in Union Oil, so far 
the most successful enterprise. Giv-
en Japan's strong interest in deve-
loping captive sources of energy, it 
is reasonable to assume that it will 
take a significant share in such 
major projects as gas liquefaction 
that Thailand has in mind. Involve-
ment of this kind may give Japan an 
even larger role than it already 
has, largely because EEC compa-
nies have taken little interest in this 
field. 
It is useful, however, to re-
member that Japan looms so large 
not because it has given priority to 
investment in Thailand but because 
others have been even less forth-
coming. As Thai commentators la-
ment, their country accounted for 
only 5.6 per cent of Japan's total 
outstanding investment in Asean in 
1980, compared with 16 per cent 
in 1971.0 
A day in Rome 
[ Cont 'd from page 5] 
galleries, through drawing rooms 
and kitchens and pass finally 
through a secret door into yet ano-
ther room, where, around a table, 
the signatories to the Treaties are 
having their meal. The dessert has 
been served. The intruders explain 
thezr presence and, the Plenzpoten-
tiaries, seeing the funny side, agree 
to finzsh off what they had started 
durzng the afternoon ceremony. 
But as they prepare to sz"gn, they 
all hunt through thezr pockets. No-
body, of course, has got a pen. 
Except one of the officials who, 
still zn his ordinary suit, has his 
pen with him. And in the end all 
the Plenzpotenti'aries borrow it lo 
szgn on the dotted lznes. 
When we look back at all the 
problems and crzses the European 
Communities have been through zn 
thezr twenty-jive years, it is amus-
zng to recall that even the szgning 
zn Rome on 25 March 1957 did 
not go off without a hitch. 
J. Ch. Kasel 
Mr. Piet Dankert 
new President of 
European Parliament 
Mr. Piet Dankert, a Dutch Socialist with lengthy experz'ence zn 
European znstitutions was elected to serve as President of the European 
Parliament for the next two-and-a-half years. 
Mr. Dankert, the Socialzst party candidate for the Presidency, beat 
out European Peoples' Party candidate Egon Klepsch 191-175 in the fourth 
round of balloting to succeed Simone Veil as President of the first elected 
European Parliament. 
Mr. Dankert won his election after serving as a Vice President of the 
Parliament since the election in 1979 and also after gaining dzstinction as 
a dynamic rapporteur on the Community budget. He repeatedly fought for 
more Parliamentary authorz'ty in the formulation of the Community 
budget, a task he said he would continue in the Presidency. 
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THE COMMUNITY'S 
PROJECT AID IN ASIA 
The European Community is continuously enlarging both the scape 
and the size of its overall assistance to the developing countries which is 
additional to the development aid offered to the Third World by each of 
the ten Member States of the Community individually. The Community's 
aid package consists today of food aid, project aid, technical assistance, 
scholarships at universities both inside and outside the Community, voca-
tional training at institutes and in plants in Europe, trade promotion 
programmes and financial and technical assistance in the energy field. 
Almost all of the developing 
countries of Asia are beneficiaries 
to at least some of these measures 
and most of them benefit from 
them all. Project aid is the mea-
sure that has shown the biggest 
growth in recent years, both in 
regard to the 62 countries of Afri-
ca, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
which are signatories to the Lome 
Convention with the Community, 
and which benefit from the Euro-
pean Development Fund, and in 
regard to developing countries of 
Asia and Latin America. For them 
the Community provides funds in 
its annual budget under the head-
ing: Technical and Financial Assis-
tance to the Non-Associated Deve-
loping Countries. This last men-
tioned assistance programme was 
introduced in 1976 and from a 
modest 20 million ECU (the Euro-
pean Currency Unit) in that )'ear, 
the available annual amount has 
grown to 200 million ECU in 1982. 
Up to the end of 1981 not less 
than 533 million ECU or about 
US$600 million had been allocated 
to development projects in Asia 
and Latin America and of these 
approximately US$450 million in 
Asia. 
Guidelines 
The programme for the non-
associated developing countries is 
based on policy guidelines laid 
down in an EEC regulation. 
Briefly, these policy guidelines 
may be summarized as follows: 
- the aid shall be directed 
to the poorest developing countries 
and to the poorest sections of their 
populations. This implies that only 
developing countries with a per 
capita income of less than US$750 
are eligible under the programme; 
- it shall be aimed essential-
ly at developing the rural sector, 
with particular emphasis on the 
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improvement of food supplies; 
- a subsidiary part of the 
funds shall be directed towards re-
gional projects (in which case pro-
jects outside the rural sector may 
be considered); 
- a limited proportion of 
the funds shall be set aside for 
exceptional measures, particularly 
post-catastrophe reconstruction pro-
jects; 
- the aid shall be in grant 
form, and may be used to cover 
both foreign and local costs; 
- projects may be funded 
directly (autonomously), or in cofi-
nancement with Member States or 
international organizations; 
- the allocation of funds 
should help maintain a Community 
presence in the major regions of 
the developing world. 
Each annual programme has 
been prepared on the basis of pro-
ject ideas, gathered by the Com-
mission from the eligible recipient 
countries, from Member States aid 
agencies, and from international 
aid organizations. The selection 
and preparation of projects has 
been made in accordance with the 
basic policy objectives outlined 
above, while taking account not 
only of the technical and economic 
viability of individual projects, but 
also of the need to construct a 
balanced overall programme in 
keeping with the relative needs of 
the different recipients. 
Cooperation with recipient 
countries 
Full attention is given to the 
preferences expressed by the go-
vernments of the recipient coun-
tries, and to the fit between indivi-
dual projects and the overall deve-
lopment needs and priorities of the 
countries concerned. An increasing 
effort has in fact been made to 
ensure a greater coherence among 
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the actions financed by th, 
munity in individual re1 
countries over successive years. l't>· 
example, particular regions or sec-
tors have on occasion been sele£ted 
as priority areas for Community 
funding with certain recipients. 
Once a project has been fully 
appraised, the final financing deci-
sion is taken by the Commission 
after having consulted the Member 
States. Up till 1980, this consulta-
tion was carried out once a year, 
in the form of a presentation to 
the Council of Ministers of the 
annual programme taken as a 
whole. From the 1981 programme 
onwards, however, the Commission 
has been able to seek an opinion 
on individual projects from the fi-
nancing committee set up under 
the new Regulation. This commit-
tee, comprising Member State re-
presentatives and chaired by the 
Commission, meets several times a 
year, and projects can thus be 
processed as and when they are 
ready, rather than being delayed 
until the entire programme has 
been prepared. 
The funds for the pro-
grammes are provided under the 
general budget of the EEC, with 
separate annual provisions for com-
mitments and payments. The com-
mitment credits are "dissociated," 
so that under the Community's fi-
nancial regulations there is a two-
year period in which the available 
credits must be committed (i.e., 
the relevant budget year plus the 
following year). If credits are not 
committed within this period, by 
financing decisions for specific in-
dividual projects, the funds are 
cancelled. 
The Commission's practice is 
to commit the entire funding re-
quired for a particular project at 
the commencement of that project. 
Naturally, however, payments aris-
ing from that commitment will be 
spread over the entire execution 
period of the project concerned. For 
the kind of rural-development pro-
jects financed under this pro-
gramme, this execution period is 
generally of the order of 5 years, 
though it may on occasion be as 
little as 1 year or as much as 7 
years. 
Asia, biggest recipient 
When we consider the alloca-
tion of the funds Asian countries 
are by far the biggest recipients. 
74% of available programme re-
